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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
TRUSTS-CREATION BY PRECATORY WoRDs.-Testatrix used the following
language: "I wish to will my property to my husband, asking that he in
turn leaves it equally to my two children." Held, that the will created a
precatory trust under which the husband took only a life estate. Common-
weath ex rel State Tax Commis.,ion v. Willson's Admr. (Ky. 1929) 21 S. W.
(2d) 814.
The early tendency in England was to hold all precatory expressions in
wills as absolutely binding trusts because the precatory words were merely a
courteous means of creating a duty. Malim v. Keighley (1794) 2 Ves. Jr.
333; Knight v. Knight (1840) 3 Beav. 148. But the court in Portsmouth v.
Shackford (1866) 46 N. H. 423, said: "The current of American authority
and the later English cases is against converting the discretion of the donee
into an absolute trust, and in favor of giving effect more fully than former-
ly, to the intention of the testator, giving to his words their natural and or-
dinary sense." In accord: In re Pennock's Estate (1853) 20 Pa. 268;
Hughes v. Fitzgerald (1905) 78 Conn. 4, 60 Atl. 694; Sands v. Waldo (1917)
100 Misc. Rep. 288, 165 N. Y. S. 654.
The question as to whether or not a trust has been created is largely one
of interpretation. Some writers have attempted to classify the decisions
according to the particular precatory word used by the testator as "wish-
ing," "requesting," "feeling confident," "hoping," etc., but the more practical
rule seems to be to disregard the particular word used since "the use of any
particular precatory word will not determine the question of intent."
Bogert, Trusts (1921) 48. There are, however, certain guides which help
to determine intent. A requirement imposed by some courts is that there
be certainty in the precatory clause as to the parties who are to take and
what they are to take. Floyd v. Smith (1910) 58 Fla. 12, 51 So. 537; Coul-
son v. Alpaugh (1896) 163 Ill. 298, 45 N. E. 216. Other courts, however,
are not the least bit daunted by the fact that discretion in selection within
a named class is left to devisee. Cox v. Wills (1891) 49 N. J. L. 130, 22
Atl. 794; Weber v. Bryant (1894) 161 Mass. 400, 37 N. E. 203.
From the standpoint of the present day tendency, the Willson case is, per-
haps, to be criticized because it fails to question the sagacity of enforcing
mere precatory words as a trust. The decision, however, is probably to be
justified on the ground of giving effect to the testatrix's intent, evidence of
which probably appeared in the trial in the lower court. G. E. S., '31.
WILLS-COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES-REVOCATION OF PRIOR DIsiNHERr-
ING WILL.-A witness who subscribes a will under which he is beneficially
interested is generally, by statute, declared competent, though the bequest
to him is void unless there is a sufficient number of other witnesses. The
application of these statutes in cases where the witness is indirectly inter-
ested under the will, or under a writing revoking a prior will, presents a
problem on which a variety of results has been reached. In a recent Ne-
braska case it was held that a will revoking prior wills was not invalidated
because one of the subscribing witnesses was an heir who had been disin-
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herited under the first will. In re Charles' Will (Neb. 1929) 225 N. W.
869. C. died leaving four heirs who had been disinherited by a will made
several years before. Shortly before death, C. made a will revoking all
prior wills, with the express intent that his property pass by intestacy. One
of the two necessary witnesses to this document was one of the heirg. The
Nebraska statute provides that "all beneficial devises, legacies, and gifts to a
subscribing witness shall be void unless there are two other competent wit-
nesses." Comp. Stat. (1922) sec. 1248. It was held that inasmuch as there
was no express law disqualifying an interested witness, such witness is
competent. By expressly leaving open the question of the forfeiture of the
heir's intestate share, the court recognizes the possibility of direct applica-
tion of the statute to this case through forfeiture of the witness' beneficial
interest, i. e., his intestate share.
An opposite result was reached under similar facts in Pfaffenberger v.
Pfaffenberger (1920) 189 Ind. 567, 127 N. E. 766. An heir witnessed a
document which revoked a will under which he had been disinherited. It
was held that his interest, not being such as could be forfeited under the
statute, rendered him incompetent as a witness, and since there were not
sufficient other witnesses the revocation was held void and the former will
established.
Under similar circumstances Murphy v. Clancy (1914) 177 Mo. A. 429,
163 S. W. 915, reached practically the same result as the principal case in
holding that the heir was a competent witness since there was no gift to him
in the document that he witnessed. This case goes farther than the prin-
cipal case, however, in declaring that the indirect interest which will not
disqualify a witness will not be reached by the statute so as to work a for-
feiture of this interest.
The opinion in the principal case closely follows that of Hayden v. Hayden
(1922) 107 Neb. 806, 186 N. W. 972, in which it was held, inter alia, that a
spouse may be a competent witness to a will under which the consort is a
devisee. This situation presents a related problem to that of the heir wit-
nessing a revocation of a will under which he is disinherited. In both the
principal case and Hayden v. Hayden the question of the validity of the in-
direct gift to the witness is left open, thus indicating that the statute may
work a forfeiture of the bequest to the spouse of the witness in the one case,
and of the intestate share of the witnessing heir in the other. This result
was reached in Jackson d. Cooder v. Woods (N. Y. 1799) 1 Johns Cas. 163,
where it was held that a bequest to the husband of a witness was void, and
the wife thus became a competent witness.
A different result was reached in Sullivan v. Sullivan (1871) 106 Mass.
474, 8 Am. Rep. 356. The whole will was declared void where the spouse
of a witness was a legatee under the will. By analogy, this decision sup-
ports the view taken in Pfaffenberger v. Pfaffenberger, above.
A third result was reached in White v. Bower (1913) 56 Colo. 575, 136
Pac. 1053, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 853, in which it was held that a bequest to the
husband of a witness did not render the witness incompetent nor create such
an interest as to render the bequest void. This decision, which represents
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the prevailing rule, supports Murphy v. Clancy, supra, in holding that the
statute cannot be extended so as to nullify an indirect interest in the wit-
ness, and that, therefore, such an interest neither disqualifies the witness,
nor works a forfeiture of the gift in which he is so interested. This view
has been termed the most logical. See Evans, The Competency of Testa-
mentary Witnesses (1927) 25 MICH. L. REv. 238.
The principal case reaches the same result as Murphy v. Clancy on the
question of competency of the indirectly interested witness. The question
of the validity of the "gift" or intestate share is not decided. So far as
there is any indication of the attitude of the court on this question it points
towards the conclusion that the statute provides forfeiture of "devises,
legacies, and gifts" only, and that it would not be extended so as to work
a forfeiture of the heir's share by descent and distribution. T. G. J., '31.
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